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Abstract 
The present study used a Signal Detection approach to the study of prosody perception in 
children and adults who self-reported high levels of anxiety. Seventy-one children aged eight 
and nine years, and 85 adults listened to filtered speech and were required to discriminate 
angry, fearful and happy tones of voice. Anxiety levels were not associated with perception 
of affective prosody in adults. Levels of anxiety were related to children’s criterion but not 
sensitivity to prosody. Highly anxious children were significantly more liberal in reporting 
fearful prosody compared to low anxious children. Analyses of total responses suggest that 
this criterion is reflective of an interpretation bias as opposed to a response bias. Given that 
the interpretation bias was observed in children and not adults, it is possible that the bias may 
mark a vulnerability to develop further anxiety. This is consistent with previous experimental 
findings in other modalities as well as integrative models of anxiety development that 
identify such cognitive biases as predisposing factors.  Furthermore, regardless of anxiety 
level, children were comparable to adults in their accuracy for fearful prosody, yet were 
significantly poorer than adults in their accuracy for angry and happy prosody. This suggests 
that fear may be one of the first emotions children learn to identify. 
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A Signal Detection Approach to the Perception of Affective Prosody in Anxious 
Individuals: a Developmental Study 
Communicating and understanding others’ emotional states is an essential skill in 
establishing and maintaining social and interpersonal relationships across the lifespan. In 
recent times the processing of emotion has received increasing attention in the exploration of 
emotional disorders. Research suggests that individuals who suffer from both clinical and sub 
clinical levels of anxiety process emotional stimuli in a quantifiably different way to 
individuals with low levels of anxiety.  The majority of research has explored the recognition 
of facial expressions of emotions; much less is known about the relationship between anxiety 
and the recognition of vocal emotional expression. The present study used a developmental 
approach to explore anxiety-related differences in the interpretation of emotional tone of 
voice (affective prosody).  
Anxiety and the processing of emotional expressions 
Both enhanced and diminished processing of facial emotional expressions in highly 
anxious individuals have been reported. It appears that the methodology and more 
importantly the analyses used, play an important role in the effects observed. The majority of 
studies that have used basic emotion recognition or identification tasks report that anxious 
individuals are better than non-anxious individuals at recognising negative (usually fearful) 
facial expressions. When adults are presented with a series of images of emotional facial 
expressions and asked to choose the emotion depicted, high-trait anxiety adults are more 
accurate at recognizing fearful facial expressions than low trait anxiety adults (Richards, 
French, Calder, Webb, Fox & Young, 2002; Surcinelli, Codispoti, Montebarocci, Rossi & 
Baldaro, 2006). There is some evidence of enhanced recognition of negative emotions other 
than fear. For example, Joormann and Gotlib (2006) found that adults with social phobia 
showed enhanced identification of angry (but not fearful) faces when compared to controls. 
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Additionally, there is some evidence that individuals high in anxiety are not only superior at 
detecting negative emotions such as fear, but also poorer at detecting positive emotions such 
as happiness (Silvia, Allan, Beauchamp, Maschauer, & Workman, 2006). 
The findings in this area are mixed, however. There is some evidence that anxiety is 
associated with poorer identification of negative emotions. On an emotion recognition task, 
adults with a diagnosis of panic disorder were significantly poorer than controls at accurately 
recognising facial expressions of sadness and anger (Kessler, Roth, Wietersheim, Deighton & 
Traue, 2007). Other studies have reported no significant differences between high and low 
anxious adults in their ability to accurately identify emotional facial expressions depicting 
different emotional categories (Cooper, Rowe & Penton-Voak, 2008; Philippot & Douilliez, 
2005; Schofield, Coles & Gibb, 2007).  
The processing of vocal expressions of emotion: Affective prosody and anxiety 
Taken together, the literature to date suggests that the processing of emotional facial 
expressions is susceptible to individual differences in anxiety. Yet much less is known about 
the recognition of emotions in other modalities including vocal expression, and the lack of 
studies utilising auditory stimuli to examine cognitive biases in anxiety has been noted in the 
literature (Heinrichs & Hofmann, 2001). The question of whether the processing of emotional 
tone of voice is also disrupted in anxious individuals is important for several reasons. Firstly, 
the emotional tone of a speaker’s voice is a critical piece of information that we use in 
everyday life to establish meaning of speech. Children are known to use prosodic information 
from infancy onward to help them to interpret linguistic material and emotional tone of voice 
continues to be an integral component of language understanding throughout the life span. 
Similar to the recognition of facial expressions of emotions, understanding emotional tone of 
voice is a critical skill that aids daily social interactions. Disruptions in this skill likely lead to 
disruptions in interpersonal functioning. Secondly, neuropsychological research suggests that 
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the underlying neural substrates involved in the recognition of  facial and vocal expressions 
of emotions are shared (Zupan, Neumann, Babbage, & Willer, 2009). Therefore one could 
predict that a population that demonstrates atypical recognition of facial expressions may also 
show atypical recognition of emotional prosody.   
Prosody is a non-lexical component of speech and consists of linguistic prosody and 
affective prosody. Linguistic prosody helps to produce meaning by differentiating lexical 
components through stress. For example, the sentences “are you coming tomorrow?”  and 
“are you coming tomorrow?” can denote very different meanings when the word that is 
stressed is changed. Emotional or affective prosody refers to the variation of pitch, rhythm, 
intensity, and speech rate used to convey emotion through speech. For example, vocal 
expressions of discrete emotions such as, happiness or fearfulness correspond with a distinct 
idiosyncratic pattern of the prosodic components that are characteristic of vocal expressions 
of that emotion (Banse & Scherer, 1996; Pell, 2001). The production of these prosodic 
components involves both voluntary and involuntary processes; involuntary processes are 
related to physiological changes associated with emotional state, and voluntary processes 
reflect the manipulation of the voice to communicate emotional information.    
The past five years have seen rapid development in the study of affective prosody, 
and recently the role of affective prosodic interpretation in clinical disorders has been 
examined. The ability to interpret a speaker’s emotional state through their tone of voice has 
been found to be affected in a variety of mental health disorders, such as schizophrenia 
(Bozikas et al. 2006) and remitted bipolar disorder (Bozikas et al. 2007).  Only two studies to 
date have explored prosody perception in anxious adults. In the first study, Quadflieg, Wendt, 
Mohr, Miltner, and Straube (2007) examined prosody perception in 15 participants with 
generalised social phobia, and 15 healthy controls. Participants listened to 384 pseudo-words 
without semantic meaning, spoken in a happy, sad, fearful, angry, disgusted, or neutral tone 
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of voice, taken from the “Magdeburger Prosodie-Korpus”. Participants indicated on a 
questionnaire which of the six basic emotional categories the word expressed. Consistent 
with the recognition of facial expressions, highly anxious adults correctly identified more 
fearful and sad emotional prosody. They were also significantly poorer at identifying happy 
prosody compared to controls. The groups did not differ in their ability to identify neutral or 
disgust prosody. Participants also completed a self-report measure of depression and 
interestingly, the effect of anxiety on the perception of sad and fearful prosody remained 
when depression was controlled for, but the happy effect was eliminated. This suggests that 
depression was more strongly associated with the poorer accuracy for happy voices, but 
anxiety was associated with the enhanced performance for fearful and sad prosodies. 
Additionally, depression was associated with a poor ability to detect anger prosody.  
More recently Freeman, Hart, Kimbrell and Ross (2009) examined prosody 
perception in adults with combat-related post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Eleven male 
adults with a diagnosis of PTSD were administered the comprehension component of the 
Aprosdia Battery, which required them to identify six emotional prosodies; happy, sad, 
disinterested, neutral, surprised and angry. Adults with PTSD performed significantly worse 
on the emotion identification task than the twelve controls. Unfortunately the analysis did not 
examine differences between the different discrete emotions, but rather reported a global 
deficit. It is important to note however, that although Freeman et al. excluded participants 
with any neurological disease including head injury including loss of consciousness, stroke, 
history of alcoholism and any neurodegenerative diseases, comparisons between the 
population examined by Freeman et al. and other anxiety disordered adults should be made 
with caution. PTSD has distinctively different symptoms and a markedly different aetiology 
than other anxiety disorders, particularly chronic life-long combat-related PTSD (as assessed 
by Freeman et al. 2009) which is often associated with other cognitive impairments (Uddo, 
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Vasterling, Brailey, & Sutker, 1993; Vasterling et al., 2002). The preliminary findings by 
Quadflieg and colleagues (2007) and Freeman and colleagues (2009) suggest that clinical 
levels of anxiety (in this case social phobia and PTSD) are associated with an altered capacity 
to interpret emotional prosody. However it is not yet known if sub-clinical levels of anxiety 
are also associated with changes in this critical skill. 
The anxiety-related prosodic findings found in socially phobic patients (Quadflieg et 
al., 2007) is consistent with the general picture emerging from the cloudy research on the 
influence of anxiety on recognition of facial expressions of emotion. That is, anxiety appears 
to be associated with an enhanced ability to identify or recognise fear in others, and perhaps 
other negative emotions such as anger or sadness. Additionally, anxiety may be associated 
with a decreased ability to identify or recognise positive emotions such as happiness, 
however it is possible that this effect is moderated by co-morbid depression. As noted earlier, 
discrepant findings have been reported in the prosodic (e.g. Freeman et al., 2009) and facial 
expression literature (Kessler at al., 2009). One possible explanation for the inconsistency in 
findings of anxiety’s influence on emotional processing is that the reported studies have not 
systematically examined whether enhanced recognition of negative emotional expressions 
(that is, either facial or vocal) primarily reflects a difference in the sensitivity to discriminate 
discrete emotions in others or a response bias, i.e. a tendency to report particular emotions.  
Most of the studies described above that report anxiety-related differences in emotion 
perception utilise emotion recognition or identification tasks. For example participants are 
required to listen to a sentence or word and choose from a list of possible emotions which 
best describes what the actor is feeling. With the given paradigm however, the interpretation 
of results can be difficult. Consider the following example; an individual is presented with 30 
randomly-assigned sentences; 10 happy, 10 angry and 10 fearful, and they are asked to 
indicate which emotion is expressed when presented. If they respond “happy” to all 30 trials, 
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they would score 100% accuracy for the identification of happy tone of voice, and 0% 
accuracy for the identification of angry and fearful tones. This score does not in fact reflect 
the person’s ability to discriminate happy tone of voice, yet in the given paradigm, this can be 
the only conclusion that the researcher could draw. This is often the case when looking at 
accuracy scores or percentage of correctly identified stimuli. Yet when looking at the pattern 
of responding made by this participant it is clear that his/her score in fact reflects a liberal 
response criterion for happy prosody rather than an enhanced ability to detect happy prosody.  
One way to get around this problem is to present the participant with a target emotion, 
e.g. ‘happy’ amongst other distracter emotions with the task to correctly detect the happy tone 
of voice. That is, for every sentence that is presented, the participant needs to make a 
decision, (i.e. Is this happy? or not happy?). This methodology allows the responses to be 
analyzed with signal detection theory, to derive a score of sensitivity, which reflects the 
person’s ability to detect the happy voice, and a measure of response criterion, which reflects 
the person’s likelihood to make a ‘happy’ response under conditions of uncertainty.  
Signal Detection Theory 
The current study used a signal detection approach (SDT: Green & Swets, 1966; 
Macmillan & Creelman, 2005) to distinguish between an individual’s ability to detect a given 
affective prosody (e.g. fear), and their tendency to label a voice of any given prosody as 
fearful. Specifically, this research determines whether anxious individuals are better at 
detecting fear, or anger, in another’s voice, or are simply more likely to report that all voices 
sound threatening regardless of the actual tone of voice. Similarly, for positive stimuli, are 
they really poor at detecting happy prosody, or simply less likely to report it?  
Interestingly, SDT as a theoretical framework and the corresponding experimental 
paradigm have seldom been applied to the study of anxiety disorders, and never been applied 
to the perception of affective prosody, even though SDT is the generally preferred method 
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when perceptual thresholds are sought. According to SDT (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005) 
one’s task of detecting a stimulus involves two independent processes. Firstly, performance 
depends on sensitivity (d’): the individual’s ability to discriminate the target stimulus from 
the absence of it or from other stimuli. Secondly, an individual’s performance also depends 
on their response criterion (c): their general tendency to respond with “yes” or “no” when 
asked if the target stimulus is present. Describing their accuracy in terms of d’ and c will 
better reflect how individuals are processing these emotional stimuli. The exact nature of the 
mechanisms underlying the anxiety-related effects reported in previous studies is still largely 
unknown. Processing differences associated with anxiety may stem from atypical perceptual 
sensitivity to emotional stimuli or from a tendency to interpret emotional stimuli as negative. 
Some studies described earlier in the facial expression literature claim that the 
observed anxiety-related effects for negative emotional stimuli are due to sensitivity and not 
criterion/response bias (e.g. Surcinelli et al., 2006; Joorman & Gotlib, 2006; Richards et al., 
2002). From the reported method and analyses, these studies used paradigms that did allow 
for the control of response criterion (e.g. two alternative forced choice), yet they did not 
allow for the independent measurement of response bias and sensitivity. In fact when the 
method and analyses of these studies are explored further, results suggest that differences 
may be in bias, rather than sensitivity. For example, Richards et al. report that high-trait 
anxiety adults demonstrate an enhanced sensitivity for identifying fearful faces. However, 
their results suggest that anxious adults were more likely to categorise all faces as fearful, 
indicating a response bias, rather than enhanced sensitivity. This ambiguity in interpretation 
highlights the need for signal detection methodology to allow for extraction of measures of 
response criterion and sensitivity. 
Across a variety of anxiety subtypes (spider phobia, trait anxiety, and social anxiety) 
and stimulus modalities (lexical and facial expressions), the majority of studies that have used 
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a signal detection methodology report anxiety-related differences in response criterion, and 
less often in sensitivity. Interestingly, in contrast to the non-SDT studies that report anxiety is 
associated with an enhanced ability to recognise or identify negative emotions, the SDT 
studies that have found differences in sensitivity report the opposite pattern; high levels of 
anxiety are associated with poorer ability to discriminate fear in others (Garner, Baldwin, 
Bradley & Mogg, 2009; Frenkel, Lamy, Algom & Bar-Haim, 2008).  
Of these studies, some report anxiety related differences in both sensitivity and 
criterion. For example, anxious individuals displayed poorer perceptual sensitivity for both, 
mildly threatening faces and moderately happy faces as well as displaying a significantly less 
conservative criterion when judging mild and moderate degrees of fearful facial expression 
(Frenkel et al., 2008). That is, the non-anxious participants displayed a tendency to judge 
mildly and moderately fearful facial expressions as ‘less fearful” whereas the anxious group 
did not show this trend. The authors suggest that the observed normative tendency to under-
report fear in facial expressions is likely to be an effective strategy in most daily situations, as 
it allows one to ignore irrelevant or non-imminent threat. Additionally, differences in 
response criterion to positive emotional faces were also observed, such that anxious 
individuals displayed a conservative criterion, and non-anxious individuals displayed a liberal 
criterion to moderately happy faces (Frenkel et al., 2008). Together, the findings of Frenkel et 
al. suggest that compared to non-anxious individuals, anxious adults demonstrate two distinct 
biases. First, they lack the normative bias to interpret mild and moderate degrees of fearful 
stimuli as ‘less threatening’, and they lack the bias to interpret most positive stimuli as ‘more 
positive’. The authors describe this as a ‘double setback’ for anxious individuals.  
Conflicting sensitivity results (but similar criterion results) were reported in a study 
that applied the SDT paradigm to systematically measure the influence of anxiety on the 
perception of positive and negative emotional social behaviours (Veljaca & Rapee, 1998). 
Anxiety-related interpretation bias 
 
15 
Low and high socially anxious adults were asked to give a short speech in front of an 
audience who were trained to provide positive and negative cues of evaluation while the 
participant was speaking. When participants were required to detect these behaviours, highly 
anxious adults displayed a higher sensitivity to negative audience behaviours (e.g. frowns) 
than positive audience behaviours (e.g. smiling), whereas low anxious adults showed the 
opposite pattern; that is they were more sensitive to positive feedback. Consistent with the 
findings by Frenkel et al. (2008), highly anxious adults also displayed a more liberal response 
criterion to report negative audience behaviours than the low anxious adults.  
Other studies report anxiety-related differences solely in response criterion. Anxious 
individuals demonstrate a more liberal criterion to reporting negative emotional expressions 
than low anxious individuals when judging different social cues of emotional expressions, 
from video clips displaying tone of voice, facial and body expressions (Winton, Clark, & 
Edelmann, 1995). Similarly, anxious adults demonstrated a liberal criterion compared to non 
anxious adults in classifying words as threatening (Manguno-Mire, Constans & Geer, 2005). 
Additionally, some studies have reported anxiety-related criterion differences specific to 
threatening stimuli. For example, in an experiment in which highly anxious spider-fearful and 
non-fearful participants were asked to decide whether a picture of a spider, beetle, or butterfly 
was presented, highly anxious participants were not better at detecting spiders than the 
healthy controls, they were however, more liberal in reporting that they had seen a spider or 
beetle (Becker & Rinck, 2004). Others authors have failed to find any differences in either 
sensitivity or criterion (e.g. Sawchuk, Meunier, Lohr & Westendorf, 2002).  
Although some inconsistencies are observed, the emerging picture from the literature 
to date suggests that anxious adults demonstrate poorer sensitivity and a more liberal criterion 
to negative emotional stimuli. The literature supporting a liberal criterion or response bias is 
more robust than the literature supporting differences in sensitivity. This pattern has primarily 
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been observed in the facial modality. To my knowledge, the present study is the first to 
systematically examine both response criterion and sensitivity for affective prosody 
perception in anxious individuals. It is also the first study to examine these effects in both 
adults and children using the same task. 
Why use the developmental approach? 
Few studies have explored anxiety-related differences in information processing 
across both adults and children. One way of bridging the gap between child and adult anxiety 
literature is to include both populations in the same study completing the same task. 
Therefore, the second aspect of this study was to take a developmental approach to exploring 
the relationship between anxiety and prosody perception. This novel approach of studying the 
developmental trajectory of anxiety-related differences in sensitivity and criterion of prosody 
perception is important. First, this approach allows for a direct comparison of adult and child 
performance. Furthermore, establishing the presence of differences in either response 
criterion or in the ability to discriminate emotional prosody in anxious children may 
encourage further research that aims to establish whether such anxiety-related differences 
mark a vulnerability for the development of adulthood anxiety.  
Models of adulthood anxiety (e.g. Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimburg, 1997) 
suggest that abnormalities in the processing of emotional stimuli are implicated in the 
maintenance of anxiety. However, exploring these patterns across children and adults may 
help to inform about not only the maintenance but also the development of anxiety. Thus it 
seems surprising that no one has ever studied children’s and adult’s affective prosody 
processing in the same study, using the same task.  Some studies have attempted to make 
comparisons of anxiety-related effects on the recognition of facial expressions of emotions 
across studies; i.e. comparing one adult study (e.g. Richards et al., 2002) to subsequent child 
studies (e.g. Richards et al., 2007). However, these studies have altered the task requirements 
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for each age group, making comparisons across studies problematic. It is important to note 
that the idiosyncrasy of prosodic stimuli means that developmental comparisons are only 
meaningful if the same stimuli are used for adults and children. It is problematic to make 
comparisons in the ability to interpret, detect or process emotional prosody across studies 
because performance in any given study is very dependant on the stimuli used. Given that 
most studies exploring prosody perception use their own unique stimuli, what is more 
conclusive, and the process that was adopted for the current study, was not to attempt to 
compare absolute levels of performance with  those in other studies, but rather to compare 
groups and conditions within the study.   
What is known from the research on the development of prosody is that there is a 
window of development between the ages of four and twelve when a gradual and steady 
development in affective prosody perception occurs. Evidence suggests that by about age 
eleven children are able to perceive most emotional categories in voice as well as adults. The 
first study to ever systematically examine the ability of children to perceive affective prosody 
was Gates (1927; cited in Dimitrovosky, 1964) who assessed children from grade three to 
grade eight in their ability to perceive emotional meaning from a recording of the alphabet 
recited to express each of nine different emotional categories. Gates reported that the ability 
to identify the emotional expression was positively related to age. Unfortunately, however, 
only a very brief summary of this report was published (as reported by Dimitrovosky, 1964) 
therefore, overall accuracy levels, and accuracy for different emotions in the sample are not 
known.  
The next study to follow on from Gates’ work was Dimitrovosky (1964), who 
assessed prosody perception in 224 children aged five to twelve years. Children listened to 
semantically-neutral sentences depicting the following emotions; anger, happiness, love and 
sadness. The children were asked to respond by pointing to one of four stick figure drawings 
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which represented the categories of emotional meaning. Before using the drawings as 
responses in the emotion identification task, children were trained to associate each of the 
four drawings with the appropriate emotional word. The overall finding was a gradual, steady 
progressive increase in ability to identify emotional prosody with age. Five year olds 
averaged 33 % accuracy which gradually increased through to 12 year olds who average 65% 
accuracy.  
In Dimitrovosky’s (1964) sample, children demonstrated the best recognition for sad 
tones of voice, followed by angry, happy and loving, respectively. However this finding must 
be considered in conjunction with the observation that the children in this sample also 
significantly favoured negative emotions in their responding, i.e. responding “sad” and 
“angry” significantly more often than “loving” or “happy” (Dimitrovosky, 1964). 
Furthermore, while there was a decrease in the number of errors made with age, the pattern of 
a negative response bias remained stable, suggesting it is particularly characteristic of 
childhood. This finding highlights again the need again for SDT analysis in research in this 
area to assess and control for such tendencies.  
Several years later the developmental trend in prosody perception was further 
explored and supported in a cross culture study. Matsumoto and Kishimoto (1983) presented 
young American and Japanese children (aged four to nine years) with content free speech 
depicting four emotion types; happiness, anger, surprise and sadness. The authors found that 
between the ages of four and nine there is a gradual and generally steady increase in 
children’s ability to identify discrete emotions in speech, such that accuracy tends to rise 
from about 30% to about 80%, slightly higher accuracy than reported in the earlier study by 
Dimitrovosky (1964). The authors report that the trend of increasing emotion perception 
ability with age continues through each of the successive ages, yet there are differences in 
accuracy between different emotions. It is not until age 7 that children can accurately identify 
Anxiety-related interpretation bias 
 
19 
all four emotion types at a level higher than that of chance. Matsumoto & Kishimoto reported 
that the increase is apparent across cultures, yet at different rates. For example, by age six, 
American children could identify all four emotions (i.e. happiness, anger, surprise and 
sadness) above chance level, yet at the same age, Japanese children could accurately identify 
all emotions with the exception of anger, which did not emerge until age seven.     
Further studies have reported that children’s ability to perceive happy, sad and mad 
prosodies gradually increases from the age of six to ten, with eleven year olds achieving 
perfect performance on an emotion recognition task (Cohen, Prather, Town, & Hynd, 1990). 
Similar results were found with children aged five and half years to eight and a half years 
(Doherty, Fitzsimons, Asenbauer and Staunton, 1999).  
The literature clearly suggests children can accurately identify emotional prosody. 
However, it may be that although young children have the ability, the task of inferring others 
emotional state through tone of voice is susceptible to distraction in younger children. Morton 
& Trehub, (2001) tested the ability of children between age four and ten years of age to 
correctly label happy and sad prosody when presented with conflicting semantic content . 
When the prosodic and semantic emotional cues conflicted, children eight years of age and 
younger judged how the speaker was feeling based on the semantic content (i.e. what the 
speaker said) even when instructed to listen to the tone of voice, whereas children between 
nine and ten years of age were divided in their focus between semantic content and prosody, 
and adults judged the speaker’s feelings by her tone of voice. Further experiments found that 
when the content was obscured by use of a foreign language and by low pass filtering the 
English spoken utterances, children between the ages of four and ten years were able to 
accurately identify happy and sad emotional prosodies. This suggests that the initial 
observation that children under 8 years of age rely predominantly on semantic cues to form 
judgement of  the speakers emotional state reflects a tendency to accord greater weighting to 
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semantic cues rather than an inability to identify the prosodic cues, and may reflect 
developmental changes in attention rather than prosodic perception. These studies did not 
examine each emotion separately but rather the trends reflect a general increase in the ability 
to process emotional tone of voice.  
The conflicting rates of accuracy between the studies are to be expected when using 
idiosyncratic stimuli. Some use natural speech, pseudowords or filtered speech, all of which 
introduce unique processing demands to the experimental task. Additionally studies suggest 
that there is large variability in prosody perception ability within the age groups. For example 
in Dimitrovosky’s (1964) sample, the highest performing five-year-olds were more accurate 
than the lowest performing twelve-year-olds (Dimitrovosky, 1964). It is clear from the 
literature that the age range of seven to eleven years is a window of developmental change in 
prosodic processing, and therefore a good candidate age range in which to capture 
developmental effects related to anxiety. It is reasonable to hypothesise that anxiety may have 
its strongest effects while the ability to perceive emotional prosody is developing.  
Emotion recognition impairment in anxious children 
The adult literature suggests that anxious adults show differences in the way that they 
process emotional stimuli when compared to non-anxious adults, yet corresponding studies 
with anxious children are few. The research that is available however, tends to suggest that 
childhood anxiety is related to a decreased ability to interpret emotions in others. As in the 
adult literature, the majority of these studies have examined facial expressions of emotion. 
For example, children with social phobia (Simonian, Beidel, Turner, & Berkes, 2001) and 
children and adolescents with various anxiety disorders demonstrated a general (non-emotion 
specific) decrease in ability to accurately identify facial expressions of emotions (Easter, et 
al., 2005) when compared to healthy controls. Consistent with the adult literature, some 
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studies report no differences in emotion perception abilities in anxious youth (e.g. McClure, 
Pope, Hoberman, Pine & Leibenluft, 2003). 
Prosody perception in anxious children 
To date there has been one study to explore anxiety-related differences in affective 
prosody perception in children. McClure and Nowicki (2001) found that children aged 
between eight and ten years, who reported more anxious avoidant behaviours and more 
distress in social situations, had poorer accuracy at recognising vocal expressions of emotion. 
Unfortunately McClure and Nowicki did not differentiate between positive and negative 
affective prosodies, and did not use SDT. Thus it is difficult to make conclusions about what 
may have driven the reported global decrease in prosody perception for this group of anxious 
children.    
SDT paradigms with children 
Just as the literature utilizing signal detection analysis on emotion perception in 
anxious adults is sparse, even less research has been done with a child population. Findings to 
date seem to be consistent with the adult findings. Few studies have reported differences in 
sensitivity, with more studies reporting criterion differences. The few sensitivity findings in 
child samples when a strict SDT paradigm is used have found that anxiety is not associated 
with enhanced sensitivity, but rather a decreased sensitivity to discriminate emotional 
expressions in others. For example, highly anxious children were less able to discriminate 
angry from happy facial expressions than low anxious children (Richards et al., 2007) and 
children with social phobia were less sensitive than healthy controls when recognising facial 
expressions of various emotions (Simonian et al., 2001). In a less conclusive study, anxious 
children were significantly more likely to report seeing an emotion (both positive and 
negative) in an emotionally neutral face than were the controls (Melfsen & Florin, 2002).  
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Consistent with the adult findings, there have been several studies that suggest 
childhood anxiety is associated with a liberal criterion to report negative emotional stimuli, 
including prosody, social and physical cues, yet they have not systematically extracted 
measures of sensitivity or bias. For example in the study described earlier exploring prosody 
perception in anxious children, socially anxious children more frequently mislabelled fearful 
voices as sad (McClure & Nowicki, 2001). In a peer interaction task, there was no anxiety-
related difference in ability to accurately identify hostile intent in peer interactions, but 
anxious children displayed a tendency to misinterpret non-hostile situations as hostile (Bell-
Dolan, 1995). Additionally, anxious adolescents when faced with anxiety provoking tasks did 
not display any differences to non-anxious adolescents in objective physiological arousal, yet 
they reported more subjective physiological arousal than their non-anxious counterparts 
(Anderson & Hope, 2009).  
Finally the role of depression in emotional communication has been noted across 
studies, and most studies control for depression either statistically or through participant 
selection. Those that do not are problematic because anxiety and depression are highly 
associated, and the influence of depression on emotional processing, particularly for anger 
has been noted across studies (Luck & Dowrick, 2004; Quadflieg et al., 2007). Kessler et al. 
(2007) found that emotion recognition differences between anxious and non-anxious groups 
disappeared when depression was accounted for and Eley et al. (2008) found that depression 
was related to threat interpretation in eight-year-old twins but anxiety was not.   
The present study 
The present study had two clear goals. The first objective was to systematically assess 
the distinct roles of both perceptual sensitivity and response criterion in the processing of 
affective prosody in anxious and non-anxious individuals. This was done using SDT. Based 
on previous SDT studies in anxious populations, it was expected that anxiety related 
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differences would be seen in the form of a liberal criterion for negative prosody, particularly 
fear. It was hypothesized that differences in sensitivity would not be observed, or that highly 
anxious individuals would demonstrate poorer sensitivity across prosodies.   
Secondly, this study aimed to explore whether any differences in sensitivity and 
criterion vary across the developmental trajectory. Such differences may help to inform of the 
role that the hypothesised bias plays in the development and/or maintenance of anxiety. 
Given that no previous studies have compared child and adult populations across the same 
stimuli and task paradigm, there was little evidence on which to base a conclusive hypothesis 
regarding any developmental trend to be observed.   
The age group of children aged eight and nine was chosen because it fits within the 
age group identified as a developmental window for prosody perception, in which children 
are able to correctly identify most emotional prosodic categories whilst still performing at a 
level different to adults (Dimitrovosky, 1964; Matsumoto & Kishimoto, 1983). Pilot testing 
ensured that children of this age range are able to effectively use the keyboard to indicate 
their response, thus allowing the same task to be used for adults and children.  
In the present study participants listened to sentences that were low-pass filtered. This 
process was used for two reasons; it removed all semantic meaning, and it allowed for 
emotional tone of voice to still be heard, yet made the task more difficult. It is at such a level 
of uncertainty that differences in the processing of emotional stimuli have been reported 
(Frenkel et al., 2008) and studies that do not use such methods are often confounded with 
ceiling effects (see Quadflieg et al., 2007; Ellis et al., 1997). Also, it is theoretically important 
to remove semantic content. There is always an interaction between semantic content and 
prosody; removing the semantic content allows examination of the effect of prosody in 
isolation. Additionally this process was intended to minimise the tendency of younger 
children to become distracted by the semantic content of utterances, thus affecting 
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performance in prosodic evaluation (e.g. Morton & Trehub, 2001; Morton, Trehub, & Zelazo, 
2003).  
Method 
Participants 
Adults 
Eighty-five adult participants (23 males and 62 females) were recruited through the 
Introductory Psychology Research Participation Program (IPRP). Participants were 
Psychology undergraduates from Victoria University of Wellington. The average age of adult 
participants was 20 years (SD = 4.67, range = 16-43 years). All participants reported being 
native English speakers and having no visual problems that were not corrected by glasses or 
contacts and no known hearing problems. All participants reported not currently being treated 
for depression (either through counselling or SSRI medications). They received one hour 
credit toward compulsory four hours research participation as a course requirement.  
Children 
Seventy-one children (36 eight-year-olds and 35 nine-year-olds, 35 males and 36 
females) were recruited through schools in the Wellington and Manawatu regions of New 
Zealand. Schools were contacted via letters sent to the principals (see appendix A) and 
followed up via phone calls from the researcher. Information letters and consent forms were 
sent home to the parents/caregivers (see appendix B) of all children aged eight and nine years 
who were enrolled at the participating schools. All children who returned signed consent 
forms were recruited for participation in the present study. The study was approved by the 
Victoria University of Wellington’s Human Ethics Committee. 
Materials and stimuli  
Anxiety in the adult sample was measured with the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; 
Beck & Steer, 1990). Depression in the adult sample
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Inventory – Second edition (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). The BAI is a 21 item self-
report measure; each item is descriptive of subjective, somatic, or panic-related symptoms of 
anxiety in accordance with the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Health Disorders Fourth Edition (DSM-IV; 1994). The respondent is 
required to rate their experience of each symptom over the past week on a four-point scale 
ranging from zero to three. The item scores are summed to obtain a total score, ranging from 
zero to 63. The BAI has been demonstrated to hold high internal consistency, item-total 
correlations ranging from .30 to .71 and good validity (Beck, Epstein, Brown & Steer, 1988). 
Likewise, the BDI-II is a 21-item self-report measure intended to assess the severity of 
depressive symptoms in accordance with the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association; 
APA, 1994). It similarly asks participants to rate their experience of each symptom on a four-
point scale ranging from zero to three, with a total score of 63. However, the time period for 
the BDI-II is over the past two weeks.  
Anxiety and depression in children were measured with the Beck Youth inventories of 
Emotional and Social Impairment- second edition (age 7-14; Beck, Beck, Jolly & Steer, 
2005); the Anxiety Inventory, (BAI-Y) was used to measure anxiety and the Depression 
Inventory, (BDI-Y) was used to measure depression. The BAI-Y includes 20 items that 
reflects children's specific worries, fears and physiological symptoms associated with anxiety 
consistent with the anxiety disorders criteria of the DSM– IV (APA, 1994). The BDI-Y 
includes 20 items related to a child's or adolescent’s negative thoughts, feelings and somatic 
symptoms and correspond to the depression criteria of the DSM– IV (APA, 1994). A recent 
review concluded that although the youth inventories are not without problems, the 
depression and anxiety scales are a useful tool for mental health professions for accurately 
measuring disturbances in these states (Bose-Deakins & Floyd, 2004). Both youth inventories 
have a total score of 60.  
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The auditory stimuli for the emotion recognition task were 60 sentences spoken in a 
New Zealand accent by an adult female actress. Each of the 60 sentences was semantically 
neutral and was spoken in four different tones of voice; neutral, happy, angry and fearful 
(producing a total of 240 tokens). All the sentences of a particular emotional prosody were 
recorded in a single block, to maximise the actress’s emotional consistency across sentences. 
For the neutral prosody the actress was instructed to put as little emotion as possible into her 
voice; for the fearful prosody, the actress was told to aim for a panic, high arousal tone of 
voice; for angry prosody the actress aimed for cold bitter anger (low arousal); and for the 
happy prosody the actress was told to aim for a joyful, high arousal tone of voice. The digital 
stimuli were recorded at a professional sound studio with a Neumann U87 microphone, using 
the software Protools version 7, controlled by a Macintosh G5 computer. The recordings 
were made in one channel (mono) at 24 bits and 44100KHz. The editing software Audacity 
version 1.2.6 was used to duplicate the mono recordings to make stereo files, convert the files 
to 16 bits, add 40 ms of silence to the beginning of each sentence, and to equate the sentences 
for peak amplitude.  
The sentences were low pass filtered to remove all perceivable semantic content. This 
was done using Praat version 4.6.06 system for doing phonetics by computer (Boersma, 
2001). Filtering was done using a Pass Hann Band of 0-550 Hz. After the low pass filtering, 
the sentences were re-amplified.  In line with signal detection theory, the stimulus must 
include ‘noise’, making the stimulus more difficult to perceive. In research on facial 
expressions of emotions, this is typically achieved by morphing the faces to display various 
degrees of any given emotion. With prosodic stimuli this can be done by low pass filtering. 
This procedure makes the speech unintelligible, but preserves the emotional tone of voice and 
eliminates concurrent semantic and phonological processing. This procedure yields stimuli 
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that sound like the participant is listening to someone speaking on the other side of wall. Prior 
to filtering the sentences were piloted to ensure that they reflected the target emotions.  
Extraction of the acoustic parameters was done using Praat. The filtered sentences 
were analysed to calculate: Fundamental frequency or F0 (with an auto-correlation method; 
floor 75hz, ceiling 500hz); Standard deviation of F0 (Variability); Duration and Number of 
words. Fundamental frequency is the physical characteristics of the acoustic stimulus that 
most closely corresponds to perceived pitch. The average parameters for each emotional 
category are represented in Table 1. The duration included the 40ms of silence at the 
beginning of each sentence and given that the same sentences were used for each emotional 
category, the average number of words was 7.1. Speech Rate (words per minute) was 
calculated as such; (Number of words/ms) x 60000. 
Table 1    
Acoustic Parameters for Angry, Fearful, Happy and Neutral Prosodic Sentences 
Prosody Mean F0 (Hz)  SD F0 (Hz) Speech rate (wpm) 
Angry 198.87 43.03 213.13 
Fearful 347.98 57.42 225.50 
Happy 273.32 72.75 184.30 
Neutral 180.5 41.1 152.87 
 
The 60 sentences were divided into two lists (i.e. List A and B). Each participant 
completed 3 blocks, each one a mixture of sentences spoken in the target emotional voice and 
an equal mixture of the three distracter emotions. That is, each participant completed a happy 
block, a fearful block and an angry block. Neutral sentences did not appear as targets, they 
were only used a distracters.  Within each block 60 sentences were presented (30 target 
emotion and 30 distracter emotions), for a total of 180 trials per participant. The distracter 
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sentences were made up of a random selection from the list that was not the target list for that 
block, that is, targets and distracters were filtered versions of different sentences. For 
example, for participant one, block one was a “Happy block” therefore happy tone of voice 
was the target, and 30 sentences from Happy list A were presented. The distracter sentences 
for this block included 10 neutral, 10 angry and 10 fearful sentences from list B. The 
assignment of lists to emotion conditions and block order were counterbalanced across 
participants. The experiment was programmed and presented using a Dell PC running 
Psychology Software Tools’ E-Prime Suite version 1.0 (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 
2002).  
Procedure 
Adults 
Each participant came into the lab for 30 minutes and was given an information and 
consent form to sign (see appendix C) before completing the listening task and 
questionnaires. Participants were told that they were going to participate in a computerized 
experiment (approximately 20 minutes), and fill out some questionnaires (approximately 10 
minutes).  
The task was completed in a large room with computers at individual cubicles, desks 
and chairs. Participants completed the experiment individually on their own computer, with 
up to 6 participants completing the experiment at any one time in the room.  They were told 
to read the instructions on the screen. Firstly participants completed 12 practice trials. They 
were told to pay close attention, because the sentences that they were to hear were muffled 
and would sound as if they were listening through a wall. Instructions were presented on the 
computer monitor with black font on a white background. The experimenter read the 
following instructions verbatim from the screen: 
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“You will be listening to sentences that sound muffled. Although you will not be able to hear 
what the person is saying, I want you to judge the emotional tone of voice”.  
 
“Let's practice. The tone of voice you will hear will either be happy, fearful, or angry. Click 
on the emotion that you think best describes the actor’s tone of voice”. 
Participants were told to start the practice trials, in which they were required to 
identify the emotions. The practice trials consisted of 3 sentences spoken in each of three 
different prosodies. These sentences were not used in the experiment.  After the practice trials 
the participants were asked if they had any questions before moving onto the experiment 
which consisted of 2 blocks of 60 sentences. They were told that the blocks would be slightly 
different to the practice trials in that they would simply have to choose “Happy or not 
happy”; “Angry or not angry”; and “Fearful or not fearful”. 
They were instructed to choose the answer that best suited the tone of voice.  The task 
was split into 3 blocks, 60 trials per block. Participants listened to the sentences through 
earphones while sitting at a computer, and followed the instructions on the computer to make 
a forced choice response on the computer key pad after each sentence, i.e. Press 1 = Target 
emotion, 2 = Not target emotion. The computer recorded responses. The instruction screen 
was as follows: 
“In this first block of trials, you will be listening for a [Target Emotion] voice. If the voice is 
[Target Emotion], press the 1 key. If it is a different emotion, press the 2 key” 
Participants were not given any feedback on their responses. Following the 
experiment, each participant was given the questionnaires to complete; the questionnaire had 
the subject’s participant number on the top, and they were instructed to not put any 
identifying information (e.g. name) on the questionnaire. The experimenter read through the 
instructions on the top of the questionnaire aloud, and told the participants to ensure they had 
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read it carefully before they began. Order of questionnaires was counterbalanced, such that 
half participants completed the BAI first, and half completed the BDI first. After the 
experiment was finished, the participants were verbally debriefed about the conditions and 
aims of the study, given a debriefing form (see appendix D) and asked if they had any 
questions.  
Children 
 Procedure for the child sample was similar to that of adults in all aspects, except that 
data collection took place at the child’s school in a separate room provided for testing by the 
school. Testing for children took place over two separate days. On the first day all children 
completed the questionnaires. This was done by the experimenter individually with each 
child. The experimenter read through each question with the child and the child marked their 
response on the record form. However, for children who reported they could read through the 
questions themselves, the experimenter read the first question aloud, and the children read 
through the remaining questions themselves. The children were instructed to ask the 
experimenter if they had any questions or if there were words that they did not understand.  
 On the subsequent day the children completed the computerised listening task. At any 
given time, there was up to three children completing the task at once, each on a separate lap 
top computer that was provided by the experimenter. Each lap top computer had good quality 
Panasonic stereo headphones (model RP-HT160; XBS) with circumaural cushions to 
maximise sound quality and minimise distraction for the children. Each child was given a 
small gift as a thank you for their participation and a debrief form (see appendix E) to give to 
their parents/caregivers at the end of the second session.  
Design 
The study was a mixed model 3 x 2 x 2 design. The independent (within-subject) variable 
was emotion (happy, angry, fearful), the between subject variables were anxiety level 
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(high/low) and age (adult/child). The dependant variables were sensitivity measured by d’ 
and response bias measured by c (see below). 
 
Statistical analysis 
Overall accuracy rates for each individual were calculated by adding their correct 
responses across each of the three types of emotional prosody. Because the listening task was 
a signal detection task, a signal detection analysis was conducted on the participants’ 
response.  Hit rates (HR) were calculated for each individual by dividing their hits (e.g. a 
happy response to a happy trial) by the number of target present trials (i.e. hits/30). A false 
alarm is when a participant gives a target (e.g. happy) response to non target (or distracter) 
sentence. False alarm rates (FA) were calculated for each individual by dividing the false 
alarms by the number of each given emotional prosody sentence (i.e. false alarms/30). 
Additionally separate false alarm rates were computed for each distracter emotion, e.g. on a 
happy block, a fearful FA rate was calculated when a participant called a fearful distracter 
happy and an angry FA rate was calculated when a participant called an angry distracter 
sentence happy. This allowed for the examination of how well the participant could 
discriminate the target emotion from each distracter.  
Z scores were calculated for each hit rate and false alarm rate. These scores were used 
to calculate sensitivity (d’) and criterion (c) scores for each individual with the following 
equations described by Macmillan and Creelman (2005):  
 
d’ =z(HR)-z(FAR)   c = - ½ [z(HR) + z(FAR)] 
 
Sensitivity (d’) is a measure of the participant’s ability to differentiate between a 
given emotional prosody and distracters.  A sensitivity score of zero reflects an inability to 
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discriminate a given prosody from the distracters. That is for a participant who is just as 
likely to say “happy” on a happy or not happy trial their hits and false alarms will be equal, 
giving them a sensitivity score of zero.  As a participant’s sensitivity increases, they make 
more hits and fewer false alarms because they are becoming more accurate at differentiating a 
given emotional prosody from the distracters (i.e. noise), that is, increased perceptual 
sensitivity results in larger sensitivity values.  
The response bias score or criterion (c) reflects the degree to which ‘happy’ responses 
or “not happy” responses are preferred. A positive value of criterion reflects a tendency to say 
‘not a target’ (conservative bias), whereas a negative value of criterion reflects a tendency to 
say ‘target’ (liberal bias). d’ and c are independent except when d’ approaches the ceiling or 
floor. Measures of sensitivity and criterion were calculated for each of the three target 
emotions. 
Results 
Participant characteristics 
Both adult and child participants were separated into two groups; high anxiety and 
low anxiety by means of a median split based on their overall score on the BAI or BAI-Y 
Demographics of the participant groups is reported in Table 2.  
Table 2  
Participant Demographics, Anxiety and Depression Scores (Standard Deviations) 
 Adults Children 
  Low anxiety High anxiety Low anxiety High anxiety 
Mean Age 20.72 (5.99) 18.47 (2.40) 8 years n=22  8 years n=14 
   9 years n=15 9 years n=20 
n of males  14 9 21 15 
n of females 30 32 16 19 
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Anxiety (BAI and BAI-Y) 5.89 (3.98) 14.30 (8.39) 9.46 (3.70) 21.38 (5.03) 
Depression (BDI and BDI-Y) 5.23 (2.96) 15.90 (4.79) 7.05 (3.27) 15.74 (6.95) 
Correlation BAI*BDI 0.38** 0.54* 0.64** 0.42* 
Note the BAI and BDI have maximum scores of 63, the BAI-Y and BDI-Y have maximum scores of 60. 
* p<0.05 
** p<0.001 
Dependent variables were analysed in a 2 (anxiety: high, low) x 2 (age: adult, child) x 
3 (emotional prosody: happy, fearful, angry) mixed ANOVA with anxiety and age as 
between-subjects variables and emotional prosody as a within-subject variable. Depression 
scores as measured by the BDI were included as a covariate for all analyses. All effects of 
emotion were further explored with post-hoc t-tests using the Bonferroni corrected 
significance level of p = 0.016 to compare specific emotions while controlling for multiple 
comparisons. Sex was included in the initial analysis. No sex differences were observed, 
therefore it was excluded for subsequent analysis.  
Sensitivity 
Table 3 presents the mean sensitivity (d’) scores of each emotion for both adult and 
child participant groups. The ability to discriminate between a target emotional prosody and 
distracters (d’) was analysed in a 2 (anxiety: high, low) x 2 (age: adult, child) x 3 (emotional 
prosody: happy, fearful, angry) mixed ANOVA with anxiety and age as between-subjects 
variables and emotional prosody as a within-subjects variable. 
There was a main effect of age, F(2 , 302) = 29.30, p < 0.001 and a main effect of 
emotion, F(2 , 302 ) = 23.50, p < 0.01. These were qualified by an age x emotion interaction, 
F(2 , 302) = 44.316, p < 0.01. Follow up independent samples t-tests showed that adults were 
significantly better than children in their ability to detect angry and happy prosodies, t(154) = 
7.05, p < 0.001, and t(154) = 10.17, p < 0.001 (respectively).  Yet the two groups did not 
significantly differ in their ability to detect fearful prosody, t(154) = -1.56, p = 0.12. In fact 
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children displayed non-significantly better discrimination than adults for fearful voices. 
(Refer to figure 1). There were no effects of anxiety. 
 
 
Table 3  
Mean sensitivity scores (d')and (standard deviations) for low, high and combined anxious 
adults and children 
  Emotional prosody  
Participant group Angry Fearful Happy 
Adults     
     Low anxiety 1.32 (0.82) 1.66 (0.61) 1.68 (0.78) 
     High anxiety 1.27 (0.65) 1.49 (0.69) 1.82 (0.76) 
    Combined  1.30 (0.74) 1.60 (0.65) 1.75 (0.77) 
     
Children     
    Low anxiety 0.50 (0.72) 1.90 (1.25) 0.71 (0.56) 
    High anxiety 0.49 (0.62) 1.78 (1.59) 0.55 (0.55) 
   Combined   0.49 (0.67) 1.84 (1.41) 0.63 (0.56) 
 
Given the main effects and interaction involving age, sensitivity was analyzed in 
adults and children separately. When adults and children were examined separately, adults 
displayed a main effect of emotion F(2 , 164) = 4.32, p < 0.05. Adults were significantly 
better at detecting happy and fearful tones of voice than they were at detecting angry tone of 
voice, t(82) = - 4.64, p < 0.001 and, t(82) = -3.17, p < 0.001, respectively.  
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Children also showed a main effect of emotion, F(2, 136)= 18.71, p < 0.001. But in 
contrast to adults, post hoc t-tests revealed that children were significantly better at detecting 
fearful tone of voice than they were at detecting angry, t(70) = -8.89, p < 0.001, and happy 
tone of voice, t(70) = 8.20, p < 0.001. Children were equally poor at discriminating angry and 
happy tones of voice, t(70) = -0.56, p = 0.123  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. A comparison of children’s and adult’s ability to discriminate different emotional prosodies. 
Error bars represent standard error values. Note, higher d’ values reflect better ability, and lower 
values reflect poorer ability. * p < 0.001 
 
  
Criterion  
Table 4 presents the mean criterion ( c ) scores of each emotion for both adult and 
child participant groups. Overall, adults were very conservative on happy trials, less 
conservative on angry trials and slightly liberal on fearful trials. Children showed little to no 
bias on happy trials, and were quite liberal on fearful and angry trials.  
 
 
* 
 
* 
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Table 4  
Mean criterion ( c ) and (standard deviations) for low, high and combined anxious adults 
and children 
  Emotional prosody  
Participant group Angry Fearful Happy 
Adults     
     Low anxiety 0.18 (0.39) -0.06 (0.40) 0.24 (0.37) 
     High anxiety 0.10 (0.40) 0.03 (0.41) 0.28 (0.36) 
     Combined  0.15 (0.39) -0.02 (0.40) 0.26 (0.36) 
     
Children     
    Low anxiety -0.14 (0.29) -0.10 (0.27) 0.03 (0.28) 
    High anxiety -0.08 (0.31) -0.25 (0.30) -0.03 (0.27) 
    Combined   -0.11 (0.30) -0.17 (0.29) 0.00 (0.27) 
Note. Positive values reflect a conservative criterion and negative values reflect a liberal 
criterion. 
 
Participants’ response biases were analysed in a 2 (anxiety: high, low) x 2 (age: adult, 
child) x 3 (emotional prosody: happy, fearful, angry) mixed ANOVA with anxiety and age as 
between-subjects variables and emotional prosody as a within-subject variable. There was an 
interaction between emotion and BDI, F(2, 302) = 3.12, p < 0.05 in the omnibus ANOVA. 
There was no main effect of depression, F(2, 302) = 0.31, p = 0.58. This was followed up 
with correlational analyses; the BDI correlated with angry bias, r = -0.17, p < 0.05, indicating 
that the higher a participant’s depression score was, the more likely they were to call a 
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sentence angry during the angry block. Given that children and adults varied in their bias (see 
below) children and adults were then separated. When this was done, the effect approached 
significance for adults, r = -0.21, p = 0.056 but disappeared for the children, r = -0.05, p = 
0.70.  
 There was a main effect of emotion, F(2, 302) = 9.50, p < 0.001 and a main effect of 
age, F(2, 302) = 38.33, p < 0.001. These were qualified by a significant emotion x age x 
anxiety interaction, F(2, 302) = 3.220, p < 0.04. This interaction was explored by examining 
the effects of emotion and anxiety for adults and children separately. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Response biases to different emotional prosodies in low and high anxious adults and 
children. Note positive values reflect a conservative response bias, and negative values reflect a 
liberal response bias. 
 
When adults and children were analysed separately, adults showed a main effect of 
emotion, F(2, 164) = 9.155, p < 0.01 such that they were more conservative during the angry 
block and the happy block than the fearful block, t(84) = 3.04, p < 0.01 and  t(84) = -5.19, p < 
Adults             Children  
* 
Angry  Fearful  Happy Angry          Fearful       Happy 
Target Emotion 
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0.001, respectively. There was no main effect, F(2, 164), = 0.28, p = 0.60 or interaction with 
anxiety, F(2, 164) = 0.10, p = 0.91. 
In contrast, the children showed no main effect of emotion, F(2, 136)= 1.37, p = 0.26, 
but the interaction between anxiety and emotion approached significance F(2, 136) = 2.69, p 
= 0.07. Although both groups demonstrated a liberal response bias overall, independent t-
tests showed that highly anxious children were significantly more liberal in their responding, 
that is more likely to respond “yes” when fearful was a target than low anxious children, t(69) 
= 2.11, p < 0.05. The two groups did not differ significantly in their responding to the other 
two emotion types, i.e. angry and happy.  
False Alarm analysis for specific emotional comparisons  
When a participant makes a false alarm, they inaccurately identify a distracter as a 
target. The initial analysis analyzed participants’ abilities to discriminate each prosodic target 
from all other distracters combined. A supplementary analysis was conducted to determine 
whether there were specific distracter emotions that were most commonly misidentified as a 
target and whether these errors differed as a function of age or anxiety.  
First, the number false alarms were computed for each distracter emotion. Recall all 
together there were three target emotions (angry, fearful, happy) and there were four 
distracter emotions (angry, fearful, happy and neutral). On each block there was one target 
emotion and three distracters. Therefore on a happy block, a fearful FA rate was calculated 
when a participant called a fearful distracter happy, an angry FA rate was calculated when a 
participant called an angry distracter happy, and a neutral FA rate was calculated when a 
participant called a neutral distracter happy. This allowed for the examination of how well the 
participant could discriminate the target emotion from each individual distracter emotion (see 
tables 5 and 6). Given the large differences observed in hit and false alarm rates, this analysis 
was done separately for adults and children.  
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Table 5  
False Alarms and (standard deviations) as a function of target and distracter for low, 
high and combined anxious adults 
  Target emotion 
Participant group Distracter emotion Angry Fearful Happy 
Low Anxiety     
 Angry - 0.82 (0.72) 2.68 (1.90) 
 Fearful 1.38 (1.62) - 1.72 (2.16) 
 Happy 2.11 (1.56) 1.75 (1.44) - 
 Neutral 3.63 (3.14) 0.75 (0.80) 1.42 (1.73) 
High Anxiety     
 Angry - 0.83 (0.62) 2.38 (1.50) 
 Fearful 1.34 (1.22) - 1.73 (1.70) 
 Happy 2.39 (1.87) 1.98 (1.71) - 
 Neutral 4.13 (2.87) 0.67 (0.51) 0.94 (0.83) 
Combined (all adults)     
 Angry - 0.82 (0.67) 2.53 (1.72) 
 Fearful 1.36 (1.43) - 1.72 (1.94) 
 Happy 2.25 (1.71) 1.86 (1.57) - 
  Neutral 3.87 (3.00) 0.71 (0.67) 1.19 (1.38) 
     
Note False Alarms out of a total of ten. 
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Although there are differences in the false alarm rates of the emotions, all emotions 
have reasonably low rates of false alarms. The exception is that neutral is often 
misinterpreted as angry. A 2 (anxiety; high, low) x 3 (distracter) ANOVA was calculated for 
each target emotion separately. Whenever effects of distracter emotion were observed, they 
were followed up with post-hoc t-tests with a Bonferroni correction. Given the large 
differences in performance between adults and children in their ability to discriminate the 
different emotions, the analyses of False Alarms were conducted for each age group 
separately.  
For adults, main effects of distracter emotion were observed for all target prosodies, 
F(2, 164) = 5.32, p < 0.05;  F(2, 164) = 22.14, p < 0.001; F(2, 164) = 4.58, p < 0.05, for 
angry, fearful and happy respectively. For angry targets adults made fewer false alarms when 
fearful was the distracter than when happy or neutral were, t(84) = -5.05, p < 0.001 and t(84), 
= -6.36, p < 0.001, respectively. Additionally, adults made fewer false alarms when happy 
was the distracter compared to when neutral was the distracter, t(84) = -4.28, p < 0.001. For 
fearful targets few false alarms were made, however more false alarms were made when 
happy was the distracter than when angry or neutral were the distracters, t(84) = -6.30, p < 
0.001, and t(84) = 7.01, p < 0.001, respectively. Also, they made more false alarms when 
angry was distracter than when neutral was, t(84), = 2.5, p < 0.05. For happy targets adults 
made more false alarms when angry was the distracter than when fearful or neutral were the 
distracters, t(84) = 3.02, p < 0.005 and t(84) = 7.34, p < 0.001, respectively, indicating that 
they were more likely to confuse angry with happy prosody. They also made more false 
alarms when fearful was the distracter than when neutral was, t(84) = 2.02, p < 0.05. 
Importantly, there were no effects of anxiety on any target.  
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Table 6.  
False Alarms and (standard deviations) as a function of target and distracter for low, high 
and combined anxious children 
  Target emotion 
Participant group Distracter emotion Angry Fearful Happy 
Low anxiety  
 Angry - 2.41 (1.95) 3.91 (2.20) 
 Fearful 3.16 (2.86) - 4.39 (2.72) 
 Happy 4.23 (2.36) 3.20 (2.12) - 
 Neutral 6.42 (2.45) 1.80 (1.68) 2.70 (2.03) 
High anxiety  
 Angry - 2.56 (2.47) 4.49 (2.35) 
 Fearful 2.71 (2.41) - 3.93 (2.78) 
 Happy 3.93 (2.04) 4.25 (2.37) - 
 Neutral 6.81 (2.24) 2.66 (2.83) 3.94 (2.41) 
Combined (all children)  
 Angry - 2.48 (2.20) 4.18 (2.72) 
 Fearful 2.94 (2.64) - 4.17 (2.74) 
 Happy 4.01 (2.20) 1.51(1.29) - 
  Neutral 6.61 (2.34) 2.21 (2.33) 3.30 (2.29) 
Note False Alarms out of a total of ten. 
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Overall children were good at discriminating fear from all emotions, poor at 
discriminating happy from all emotions (even fearful), and they could discriminate angry 
from fear, but not from happy or neutral. Similar to adults, children displayed main effects of 
distracter emotion for angry and fearful target prosodies, F(2, 136) = 10.09, p < 0.001, F(2, 
136) = 3.05, p < 0.05, respectively. Yet, unlike the adults, children did not show a main effect 
when happy was the target prosody, F(2, 136) = 0.77, p < 0.46. This is likely a reflection of 
the children’s poor ability to discriminate happy tone of voice from any distracters. For angry 
targets, children made significantly more false alarms when neutral was the distracter 
compared to when happy, t(70) = -5.60, p < 0.001, or fearful, t(70) = -7.24, p < 0.001 were. 
Additionally, they made more false alarms when happy was the distracter than when fearful 
was, t(70) = -3.39, p < 0.005. For fearful targets, children made significantly more false 
alarms when happy was the distracter compared to when angry or neutral was the distracter, 
t(70) = -3.98, p < 0.001, t(70) = 4.52, p < 0.001 (respectively). Children did not differ in their 
false alarm rates when angry and neutral were the distracters, t(70) = 1.61, p = 0.11 Again, 
there were no effects of anxiety 
Discussion 
This study examined two aspects of affective prosody perception. Firstly, the 
processing of happy, angry and fearful affective prosody was examined in a sample of 
individuals who self-reported high levels of anxiety using a signal detection paradigm 
(Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). This methodology was used to systematically measure the 
relationship between anxiety, criterion and sensitivity in the processing of discrete emotions. 
Signal detection theory has been applied to exploring anxiety related differences in the 
perception of emotional expressions in other modalities yet to my knowledge this is the first 
study to apply it to the perception of emotional prosody in anxious individuals. Secondly 
these differences were examined across the developmental trajectory, using the same stimuli 
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and same task in a sample of children aged eight and nine years old and an adult sample. This 
novel approach was used to make direct comparisons between child and adult performance 
and to encourage future research to explore other anxiety related differences across the 
developmental trajectory in an attempt to examine the roles of such differences in the 
development and/or maintenance of adulthood anxiety.   
Anxiety-related findings  
Firstly, as expected, anxiety related differences were observed in individuals’ criterion 
and not in their sensitivity to emotional prosody. Specifically, high levels of anxiety in 
childhood were associated with a more liberal criterion to report a fearful tone of voice. 
Secondly, and importantly, the relationship between anxiety and criterion was observed only 
for children and not for adults. That is, highly anxious children were more likely to label a 
voice fearful than their low anxious counterparts, whereas highly anxious adults were no 
more likely to label a voice fearful than low anxious adults. This difference suggests that the 
mechanisms that support anxiety-related effects on interpretation of emotional tone of voice 
are different in children and adults. 
A Comparison with child prosody literature  
The perception of emotional prosody in anxious children has rarely been examined. 
The little research available reports that sub-clinical levels of anxiety are associated with 
poorer ability to interpret others’ vocal emotional communication (McClure & Nowicki, 
2001). Unfortunately McClure and Nowicki did not differentiate between positive and 
negative affective prosodies, or discrete emotions, and again did not use SDT; thus it is 
difficult to make conclusions about what may have been driving the poorer accuracy for the 
children. In light of the present criterion finding, poor performance in anxious children 
observed by McClure and Nowicki may be reflective of a liberal criterion for fear, i.e. that 
they tend to call more voices fearful, regardless of whether they were fearful or not, and thus 
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reducing their overall accuracy across a range of emotions. The present study observed no 
effects of anxiety on criterion for detecting anger or happiness. However it is possible that 
differences in anger or happiness were not observed because children’s sensitivity levels for 
angry and happy prosody approached the floor. 
How does this fit with other SDT findings?   
When we step away from the prosody literature, this present criterion finding 
complements several earlier observations that anxious children and adolescents make more 
threatening, unpleasant and negative interpretations of social situations (Barrett, Rapee, 
Dadds, & Ryan, 1996; Chorpita, Albano, & Barlow, 1996; Higa & Daleiden, 2008;  In-
Albon, Dubi, Rapee, Schneider, in press; Micco & Ehrenreichm, 2008; Muris, Merckelbach, 
& Damsma, 2000; Vassilopoulos & Banerjee, 2008; Waters, Craske, Bergman, & Treanor, 
2008); produce more threatening than neutral responses when presented with threat-neutral 
homophones (Hadwin, Frost, French, & Richards, 1997;& Taghavi, Moradi, Neshat-Doost, 
Yule, & Dalgleish, 2000); misinterpret non-hostile peer interaction as hostile (Bell-Dolan, 
1995); and report more subjective physiological arousal in the absence of increased objective 
physiological arousal (Anderson & Hope, 2009) than their non-or-low anxious counterparts. 
This is the first study to report the presence of an interpretation bias for fearful prosody.  
It is important to note that bias can exist on two levels; on the immediate 
interpretation of stimuli - the assignment of meaning to a stimulus (interpretation bias) and at 
the level of the motor output - making the response (response bias). Few studies are designed 
to distinguish between the two. However, in the present study if the observed anxiety related 
differences in criterion were a reflection of output response bias, one could expect to see 
differences in response bias between the high and low anxious groups across all emotional 
prosodies, which would reflect a participant’s tendency to favour one particular response (e.g. 
more liberal responding by anxious participants across all emotions). Differences in criterion, 
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however, were only observed for fearful voices, providing clear evidence that anxiety in 
children is related to an interpretation bias or the assignment of fearful meaning to voices. 
High anxious children were more likely than low anxious children to label all distracter 
emotions as fearful.   
In the literature anxious adults too have displayed negative interpretation biases with 
words and sentences (e.g., Calvo & Castillo, 1997, 2001; Calvo, Eysenck, & Castillo, 1997; 
Calvo, Eysenck, & Estevez, 1994; Eysenck, Mogg, May, Richards, & Mathews, 1991; 
MacLeod & Cohen, 1993; Taghavi et al, 2000); story completion tasks  (Huppert, Pasupuleti, 
Foa & Mathews, 2007); social situations (Butler & Mathews, 1983; Kessler et al., 2007); and 
faces (Yoon & Zinbarg, 2008). However no bias in the present adult sample was observed 
and this was notably not due to ceiling effects, as the adults were not on the ceiling for any of 
the emotions. It may be that anxious adults show an interpretation bias to some emotional 
stimuli, however not to emotional prosody. The mechanisms underlying why the bias is not 
shown for affective prosody are unknown, it may be that there is a particular characteristic of 
vocal expressions of emotions that excludes this modality from interpretation biases in 
adulthood. Given that there is so little research published exploring prosody perception in 
anxious individuals, and none with a SDT approach, further investigation is warranted to 
explore this developmental finding.  
Evidence of a predisposing factor 
The interesting dissociation that children who self-report higher levels of anxiety 
demonstrate a tendency to assign negative (fearful) meaning to emotional tone of voice, but 
adults who self-report high levels of anxiety do not demonstrate the same cognitive bias, 
suggests that the observed interpretation bias may be associated with the development of 
anxiety. That is, perhaps the tendency to interpret other’s tone of voice as fearful serves as a 
marker of vulnerability to the further development of anxiety. It is therefore possible that in 
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adulthood this interpretation bias is attenuated such that adults acquire more knowledge about 
the emotional and social communication of others and thus are better able to make accurate 
interpretations of vocal expressions of emotions. A longitudinal study would be advisable to 
determine if interpretive bias in childhood reflects a vulnerability to clinical anxiety in 
adulthood. Evidence for this developmental attenuation comes from findings that non-
anxious adults judge faces that are mild and moderately fearful as ‘less fearful” (conservative 
bias) whereas the anxious adults do not show this tendency (Frenkel et al., 2008). Frenkel et 
al. suggest that the tendency in non-anxious adults to under-report fear in other’s faces is 
likely to be an effective time saving strategy in most everyday interactions, as it allows one to 
ignore mild, non imminent signals of threat. It is possible that this tendency develops in late 
childhood or early adulthood. This would explain why the children in the current sample did 
not demonstrate this conservative bias. In fact even low anxious children in this study 
demonstrate a more liberal criterion than low and high anxious adults. Clearly this is simply 
one possible explanation and warrants further study to explore its potential validity. 
Further experimental support for the causal role of the observed interpretation bias in 
the development of anxiety comes from findings that inducing a negative bias to homophones 
increases anxiety reactivity to a subsequent stressful situation (Wilson, MacLeod, Mathews, 
& Rutherford, 2006). If the manipulation of interpretation bias in previously non anxious 
adults can cause a subsequent increase in anxiety for these individuals, it is likely that 
children who demonstrate a similar bias are thus vulnerable to develop further anxiety.  
The present findings were observed in children with sub-clinical levels of anxiety 
therefore the relevance to clinical anxiety disorders is uncertain. Various cognitive models of 
adulthood anxiety (e.g. Clark & Wells, 1995 & Rapee & Heimburg, 1997) suggest that 
cognitive processes such as attentional biases are strongly involved in the maintenance of 
anxiety once established. However given that the anxiety effects were observed only in 
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children and not in adults, it is possible interpretation biases such as interpreting emotional 
tone of voice as fearful is involved in the development as well as the maintenance of anxiety.  
Interpretation biases in anxious children are well established (Vasey & Macleod, 
2001) and some aspects of biased information processing and cognitive processes have been 
encapsulated in earlier models of anxiety (Daleiden & Vasey,1997; Vasey, Daleiden, 
Williams, & Brown, 1995) as well as contemporary, more integrative models (Vasey & 
Dadds, 2001). Vasey and Dadds suggest that cognitive biases and distortions mark just one of 
many factors that predispose to anxiety disorders. Such integrative models suggest that a 
predisposing factor such as an interpretative bias in isolation is not sufficient to develop 
further anxiety; however it is likely that most anxious children will begin their pathway with 
one of the predisposing factors, and the presence of one factor may increase the likelihood 
that other predisposing factors will occur (Vasey & Dadds, 2001). For example, a child who 
has a temperament high in behavioural inhibition traits (first risk factor; Lonigan & Phillips, 
2001) will often by nature of their temperament, behave in a shy and avoidant manner. This 
behaviour will often elicit protective parenting behaviours (second risk factor; Dadds & Roth, 
2001) which inadvertently decreases the child’s  sense of control and autonomy, and limits 
their exposure to fearful situations (third risk factor; Dadds & Roth, 2001; Menzies & Harris, 
2001) thus limiting their chances to master such contexts. Although there is a large evidence 
base for such risk factors, to my knowledge this is the first study to provide empirical support 
for the presence of an interpretation bias to emotional prosody in anxious children. Notably, 
the paradigm used in the present study does alloy for causality to inferred; it is possible that 
the interpretation bias observed is only a symptom of childhood anxiety. Hopefully this novel 
finding, however will encourage further research to explore how the observed interpretation 
bias may interact with various other individual, interpersonal and environmental factors to 
either produce and or be associated with childhood anxiety.       
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Research suggesting that individuals can be trained out of negative interpretation 
biases presents promising ideas for intervention given the current finding. Using a basic 
behaviourist approach, two studies demonstrated this training effect by presenting high 
anxious (yet sub-clinical) adults with various social scenarios. Participants were reinforced 
for resolving such situations in a positive or non-negative manner (e.g. the training phase). 
Following training, participants could not only  demonstrate their learned skill in a further 
interpretation task, but also predicted that they would be less socially anxious in the future 
than the control group (Mathews, Ridgeway, Cook, & Yiend, 2007; Murphy, Hirsch, 
Mathews, Smith, & Clark, 2007). This promising research suggests that methods such as 
reinforcing more positive interpretations of prosody may also decrease the observed 
interpretation bias in anxious children with the expectation that such a change will decrease 
their level of anxiety. This research is consistent with the literature supporting the use of 
cognitive behavioural treatments that target information processing in therapy for childhood 
anxiety (Chorpita & Southam-Gerow, 2006). However such interpretation training is likely to 
be most effective if family members of the children are also involved, as research suggests 
the negative interpretation bias is highly influenced by parents’ interpretations (Barrett et al., 
1996). It is also not clear that such training alone would be sufficient to decrease a child’s 
level of anxiety, as various other factors are known to be involved in the development of 
childhood anxiety, such as temperament (Kagan, 1999; Kagan & Snidman, 1999), social 
referencing (De Rosnay, Cooper, Tsigaras, & Murray, 2006) and parenting behaviours 
(Dadds & Roth, 2001) to name a few (for a comprehensive list of predisposing factors see 
Vasey & Dadds, 2001).  
Sensitivity  
Various methodological differences in the studies to date that have explored prosody 
perception in anxious adult (Quadflieg et al., 2007 and Freeman et al., 2009) and children 
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(MClure & Nowicki, 2001) make comparisons difficult. Moreover none of these previous 
studies used SDT analysis. However of notable difference is that the two reported studies in 
adult samples observed anxiety related differences in prosody perception – although in 
differing directions, and the present study failed to find any anxiety-related differences in 
prosody perception measured by d’ for adults. In the first adult study, Quadflieg et al. 
examined prosody perception in 15 subjects with generalised social phobia and 15 controls. 
Anxious adults were significantly more superior at identifying fearful and sad prosody 
compared to non-anxious adults. More recently Freeman et al. examined prosody perception 
using the Aprosodia Battery in 11 male adults with combat related post traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD). Adults with PTSD performed significantly poorer on the emotion 
identification task than controls (Freeman et al. 2009). Unfortunately only a global deficit in 
emotion recognition was reported and differences between the different discrete emotions 
were not analysed. Therefore the two previous studies with clinically anxious adults provided 
conflicting results, suggesting that clinical levels of anxiety (in this case social phobia and 
PTSD) may be associated with an altered capacity to interpret emotional prosody, however 
the nature of the difference, whether it is an enhanced ability or a deficit remains unclear.  
There could be several reasons why no anxiety related differences were observed in 
the adult sample in this study when two previous studies have reported (albeit conflicting) 
anxiety-related differences. The present research population included participants with sub-
clinical levels of anxiety. Previous reports of impaired identification of affective prosody in 
anxious adults was reported in a sample of 11 male veterans with an average age of 57 years 
and a clinical diagnosis of chronic and life long PTSD (Freeman et al., 2009). The 
observation of enhanced accuracy for negative affective prosody perception in anxious adults 
was reported in a study with 15 participants with a clinical diagnosis of social phobia 
(Quadflieg et al., 2007).  The present study sample included 85 adults, male and female with 
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a mean age of 20 years. Therefore clear differences in population demographics including 
sex, age (Laukka & Juslin, 2007; Paulmann, Pell & Kotz, 2008) and level of anxiety is 
evident between the three studies, likely influencing three different outcomes. The present 
study found no anxiety-related effects in an adults sample with sub-clinical levels of anxiety. 
Clearly further research that carefully considers sample characteristics, subtypes of anxiety 
and experimental task is warranted.   
Enhanced or increased sensitivity to negative emotional stimuli and poorer sensitivity 
to positive emotions in other modalities has also been noted (Veljaca & Rapee, 1998), 
however the majority of the SDT research fails to find differences in sensitivity (Sawchuk et 
al., 2002; Winton et al., 1995;) or suggests that anxiety is associated with poorer sensitivity to 
negative stimuli (Garner et al., 2000; Frenkel et al., 2008). Careful exploration of the 
methodologies of these studies reveals a clear distinction between those studies that report 
increased sensitivity and those that report poorer sensitivity. In the earlier study by Veljaca 
and Rapee, low and high socially anxious adults were asked to give a short 5 minute speech 
in front of an audience and detect positive or negative audience behaviours. Highly anxious 
adults displayed a higher sensitivity to negative audience behaviours (e.g. frowns) than 
positive audience behaviours (e.g. smiling), whereas low anxious adults showed the opposite 
pattern; that is they were more sensitive to positive feedback.  
Compare this methodology with those of the studies reporting poorer sensitivity 
(Frenkel et al., 2008; Richards et al., 2007; Simonian et al., 2001) that tend to present all 
participants with emotional stimuli, e.g. a face depicting a discrete emotion for a short period, 
and require them to make a speeded decision. In this situation, the participant has only one 
task to do, and can allocate all their attentional resources to it. These notable methodological 
differences between studies may account for equivocal findings. It seems apparent that 
anxiety-related enhanced sensitivity is only observed when the task requires participants to 
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allocate or direct their attention to emotional stimuli while there are competing or concurrent 
stimuli present. Under such conditions, anxious individuals may display an attentional bias to 
negative information and thus demonstrate heightened sensitivity to detect such stimuli. 
However under conditions where there is no competition for attention, anxious individuals 
are no better at detecting negative stimuli.    
This notion fits with theoretical models of anxiety (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & 
Heimburg, 1997) which suggest that anxiety is exacerbated or maintained by a preferential 
attention to sources of negative emotion or threat in the environment. If this is the case, 
superior sensitivity will only be observed under conditions where attention can be allocated 
in different directions and not under conditions such as the present paradigm where 
participants’ attentional resources were entirely allocated toward the auditory stimulus. Under 
such conditions it is likely that if any differences in sensitivity were to be observed, they 
would be a reflection of actual ability to detect the emotion. In contrast it is possible that in 
studies that report differences in sensitivity, the observed differences in fact reflect the 
tendency of anxious individuals to allocate more attention to emotional stimuli – thus 
increasing their ability to detect them.  A large body of literature has explored attention 
allocation in both anxious adults and children (Brotman et al.,  2007; Clarke, MacLeod, & 
Shirazee 2008; Fulcher, Mathews, & Hammerl, 2008; Helfinstein, White, Bar-Haim, & Fox, 
2008; Koster, Crombez,  Verschuere, & De Houwer, 2004; Lee, & Telch, 2008; Mogg, 
Mathews & Eysenck, 1992; Mogg, Holmes, Garner, & Bradley, 2008; Telzer et al., 2008) 
and the consensus seems to be that anxious individuals demonstrate a bias to allocate more 
attention to negative emotional depictions. 
Role of depression 
Previous observations in anxious adults have reported differences in criterion for 
happy faces as well as anxiety-related differences in sensitivity (Frenkel et al., 2008), neither 
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of which was observed in this sample. However in that study, like many studies in this area, 
depression was not statistically controlled. The present study along with previous research 
(e.g. Qualdflieg et al., 2007) demonstrates the importance of controlling for depression. 
Depression in the present adult sample was associated with a liberal bias when angry was the 
target. Depression scores correlated negatively with angry bias indicating that the higher a 
participant’s depression score was, the more likely they were to label a sentence as angry 
during the angry block.  When children and adults were analysed separately, this effect only 
held true for adults, indicating that a high level of depression in adulthood is associated with 
a liberal response bias to angry voices, but this pattern is not present in childhood. It is 
possible that such a pattern was not found in the child sample because their level of 
discriminability for angry voices was so low – at chance level. Depression in adulthood has 
previously been associated with decreased accuracy for recognising happy tone of voice 
(Qualdflieg et al., 2007) yet the influence on angry tone of voice observed in this sample is a 
new finding.  
Developmental findings 
The second key finding of the current study was the developmental difference 
observed in sensitivity to different affective prosodies. Adults were able to correctly 
discriminate all three target emotions; angry, fearful and happy. Yet children were only able 
to successfully discriminate one of the three emotional prosodies well; fearful. This was 
regardless of anxiety level. Children showed significantly better sensitivity for fearful tone of 
voice than they did for angry and happy, for both of which they demonstrated very poor 
sensitivity. The observation that children were in fact comparable to adults at discriminating 
fearful tones of voice suggests that they were able to understand the task and respond 
appropriately. Because block order was counterbalanced across participants, it also cannot be 
the case that poor discrimination of angry and happy reflected either practice or fatigue 
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effects. Thus children’s poor sensitivity to angry and happy tones of voice likely reflects a 
true lack of discriminability, not an inability to understand the task.   
The age group for the present study of children (aged eight to nine years) was chosen 
because previous research suggests that by this age, children should be fairly accurate when 
identifying all prosodies, while still performing slightly poorer than adults (Cohen et al., 
1990; Cohen, Branch & Hynd, 1994; Doherty et al., 1999; Matsumoto & Kishimoto, 1983). 
At face value, the current findings suggest that perhaps children develop their ability to 
accurately perceive angry and happy emotional prosodies later in life than previous research 
suggests.  However, as described earlier, given that each study assessing affective prosody 
perception tends to use its own idiosyncratic stimuli, drawing comparisons across studies is 
problematic. Furthermore some previous studies may have overestimated children’s ability to 
identify emotions by excluding children from analyses who used obvious strategic response 
strategies (Morton & Trehub, 2001), whereas no children were excluded from the analysis in 
the present study. It would be inappropriate to conclude from this study that children cannot 
discriminate angry and happy prosody from distracters. Rather in the context of the present 
experiment, children were worse than adults in the discriminability of anger and happiness 
while performing at adult levels in the discriminability of fear. What this finding does 
suggest, is that when children are faced with increased perceptual ambiguity, or when they 
find a task more difficult, differences in their ability to discriminate various discrete emotions 
may emerge.  
Previous studies have tended to report a gradual steady increase between the ages of 
four and twelve in the ability to identify emotional prosody, but few have examined such 
differences across discrete emotional prosodies. One of the earliest studies to systematically 
examine the ability of children to perceive affective prosody, Dimitrovosky (1964), reported 
that children demonstrated the highest recognition for sad tones of voice, followed by angry, 
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happy and loving, respectively (fear was not assessed). However this finding must be 
considered in conjunction with the findings that the children in that sample also favoured 
negative emotions in their responding, i.e. responding “sad” and “angry” significantly more 
often than “loving” or “happy”. Furthermore, while there was a decrease in the number of 
errors made with age, the pattern of a negative response bias remained stable, suggesting it is 
particularly characteristic of childhood. This bias finding highlighting again the need for 
signal detection analysis to control for such tendencies.  
The current study found highest sensitivity for fearful tones of voice. Studies to date 
have assessed children’s ability to identify sad, angry, mad, happy, loving and surprise 
prosody (Cohen et al., 1990, Cohen et al., 1994; Dimitrovosky, 1964; Doherty et al., 1999; 
Matsumoto & Kishimoto, 1983;  Morton & Trehub, 2001), however to my knowledge, this is 
only the second study to date to measure children’s sensitivity to fearful prosody and the first 
study to observe the superior sensitivity for fear over other prosodies. Unlike Dimitrovosky’s 
(1964) finding of superior accuracy for negative emotions that was in fact driven by a 
tendency to produce more negative responses, the current study extracted measures of 
sensitivity and response criterion, and observed differences between emotional prosodies in 
sensitivity and not bias. In the only other known study to date to examine fearful prosody 
perception, Fujiki, Spackman, Brinton and Illig (2008) examined the ability of children with 
language impairment to identify various emotional prosodies from speech. The eight-to-ten 
year old control group demonstrated highest accuracy for happiness, followed by anger, 
sadness and fear respectively. Clearly, this is in contrast to the differences across emotions in 
the present study. One explanation may be the stimuli and task used. Participants in Fujiki et 
al.’s study listened to the following passage:  
“It was the first day of school. I got ready early. I wanted to see who was in my 
class. I walked in my class and sat down. Pat came in and sat next to me. Then the 
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teacher walked in the room. I knew this year would be different.” 
It is likely that children were using the prosody to aid their semantic interpretation of 
the passage, which is different to processing the prosody is isolation as the current study 
required.  
From an evolutionary perspective it seems theoretically likely that fear is one of the 
first emotions that children learn to identify. Being able to accurately interpret fear in 
another’s voice appears more closely linked to survival than being able to interpret anger or 
happiness in others. Additionally there is some evidence that fear is one emotion that is 
preserved in older adults’ prosody perception relative to angry, happy and sad prosodies 
(Ruffman, Henry, Livingstone & Phillips, 2008).  
In regards to relative identification of different discreet emotions, previous research 
suggests that surprise is one of the first emotions that Japanese and American children aged 4 
learn to recognise before the recognition of sadness, happiness and anger (Matsumoto & 
Kishimoto, 1983). However that study did not include fearful prosody, and so a comparison 
of the development of fear and surprise warrants further investigation. It may also be that 
surprise and fearful prosodies share some of the same prosodic components, and are more 
perceptually salient to children. For example, both are characterised by a high fundamental 
frequency (Banse & Schere, 1996). The finding that accurate perception of anger may be one 
of the later skills to develop is consistent with previous findings examining the perception of 
discrete emotions in sequential age groups that found that anger was the last emotion, after 
surprise, happiness and sadness that Japanese children learnt to recognise (Matsumoto & 
Kishimoto, 1983; for contrasting results see control group in Fujiki et al., 2008). 
Additionally, given that there is some evidence of cultural differences between the relative 
development of different emotions, future research should include such demographics in their 
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sample. Ethnicity and culture were not recorded in the present study, although all participants 
were native speakers of English. 
General discussion  
In summary, anxious children are not more sensitive to negative tones of voice as 
some previous literature suggests, rather, elevated levels of anxiety in childhood are 
associated with a liberal bias to interpret voices as fearful. This observed anxiety-related 
pattern is not present in anxious adults. Non-clinical levels of anxiety in adulthood do not 
appear to be associated with sensitivity to or a response bias when processing happy, angry 
and fearful tones of voice. The presence of such an interpretation bias in childhood may mark 
a vulnerability to develop further anxiety; however this tendency to interpret others’ tone of 
voice in a fearful manner may be attenuated in adulthood as a normative tendency to under-
report fear becomes more adaptive.  
The second key finding came from the examination of developmental trends in 
prosody perception regardless of anxiety. Eight and nine year old children are able to detect 
fearful tones of voice at a level comparable to adults, but they have great difficulty, and in 
fact very poor accuracy at detecting angry and happy tones of voice. This finding suggests 
that fear may be one of the first emotional states that children learn to decode from others’ 
tone of voice. Both findings encourage further research into these two domains to further 
explore the role that interpretation biases may play in the development of anxiety, and the 
development of prosody perception for discrete emotions.  
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Megan Humphrey  Gina Grimshaw 
MSc Student Supervisor 
megan.humphrey@vuw.ac.nz gina.grimshaw@vuw.ac.nz 
 
 
 
 
Dear Principal, 
We are writing to invite children in your school to participate in a research project investigating how 
people perceive and interpret emotional tone of voice and how a person’s level of anxiety may influence this 
interpretation. This project has been granted approval from the Victoria University Human Ethics 
Committee.  
 
What is the purpose of this research? 
This research will allow us to examine how people perceive and interpret emotional tone of voice and 
how a person’s level of anxiety may influence this interpretation 
 
Who is conducting the research? 
• This study is being carried out by myself, Megan Humphrey, under the supervision of Dr 
Gina Grimshaw. This research is currently in the process of being approved by the University 
ethics committee. 
• The research will contribute to My Masters thesis. 
 
What is involved if you give consent for students at your school to participate? 
• All aspects of this research will take place at your school and we aim to begin data collection 
early in 2009. 
• The children will complete two short questionnaires where he/she will respond to questions such 
as “I worry people might get mad at me” and “I feel sorry for myself” . We anticipate that the 
questionnaires will take no more than ten minutes to complete. 
• Additionally, the children will complete an emotion perception task in which he/she will listen to 
voices and judge the emotional tone of voice, e.g. happy voice, sad voice, neutral voice.. We 
anticipate this task will take no longer than 20 minutes.  
• During the research, each child is free to withdraw at any point before the experiment has been 
completed.  
 
Privacy and Confidentiality 
• We will keep all consent forms and information collected for at least five years after publication. 
APENDIX A: LETTER TO PRINCIPAL 
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• The resulting Masters thesis will be kept in the Victoria University Library, and submitted 
for marking and publication. 
• Individual children will never be identified in my research project or in any other presentation or 
publication.  
• In accordance with the requirements of some scientific journals and organisations, each child’s 
coded questionnaire may be shared with other competent researchers and may be used in other 
related studies. 
• A copy of the coded data will remain in the custody of Gina Grimshaw at Victoria University.  
 
 
What happens to the information that the children provide? 
• The overall findings may be submitted for publication in a scientific journal, or presented at 
scientific conferences. 
• The overall findings will form part of a, PhD thesis, Masters thesis, or Honours research 
project that will be submitted for assessment. 
 
 
Any questions may be directed to the principal research for this project, Megan Humphrey (detail 
above) Thank you for taking the time to consider our request for participation in this research. 
 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
 
 
Megan Humphrey (MSc Student) 
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Statement of consent 
 
I have read the information about this research and any questions I wanted to ask have been 
answered to my satisfaction. 
 
I agree to participate in this research. I understand that I can withdraw my consent at any 
time, prior to the end of my participation.  
 
Name:  __________________________________ 
 
 
Signature: __________________________________ 
 
 
Date:  __________________________________ 
 
 
Student ID: __________________________________ 
 
Copy to:  
[a] participant,  
[b] researcher (initial both copies below)  
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Information Sheet for Parents 
 
Megan Humphrey Dr. Gina Grimshaw 
MSc Student Supervisor 
megan.humphrey@vuw.ac.nz gina.grimshaw@vuw.ac.nz 
   
 
 
What is the purpose of this research? 
The purpose of this study is to help us understand how children perceive and interpret vocal 
expressions of emotion and how a child’s level of anxiety may influence their interpretation. 
 
Who is conducting the research? 
• This study is being carried out by Megan Humphrey, a Masters student in clinical 
psychology, under the supervision of Dr Gina Grimshaw. This research has been 
approved by the University Human Ethics Committee. 
 
What is involved if you give consent for your child to participate? 
• All aspects of this research will take place at your child′s school  
• Your child will complete two short questionnaires where he/she will respond to questions 
such as “I worry people might get mad at me” and “I feel sorry for myself”. We anticipate 
that the questionnaire will take no more than ten minutes to complete. 
• Additionally, your child will complete an emotion perception task in which he/she will 
listen to voices and judge the emotional tone of voice, e.g. happy voice, sad voice, neutral 
voice.. We anticipate this task will take no longer than 20 minutes.  
• During the research, your child is free to withdraw at any point before the experiment has 
been completed.  
 
Privacy and Confidentiality 
• We will keep your consent forms and information collected for at least five years after 
publication. 
• The resulting Masters thesis will be kept in the Victoria University Library, and submitted 
for marking and publication. 
• Your child will never be identified in my research project or in any other presentation or 
publication.  
• In accordance with the requirements of some scientific journals and organisations, your 
child’s coded questionnaire may be shared with other competent researchers and may be 
used in other related studies. 
• A copy of the coded data will remain in the custody of Dr. Gina Grimshaw at Victoria 
University.  
 
What happens to the information that you provide? 
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• The overall findings may be submitted for publication in a scientific journal, or 
presented at scientific conferences. 
• The overall findings will form part of a Masters thesis that will be submitted for 
assessment. 
 
 
Thank you for your participation 
As a token of our appreciation, we will give your child a small gift as a thank you for their 
time and effort, at the end of the study.  
 
If you would like to know the results of this study, they will be available approximately from 
December 2009 and can be sent to you via email or mail if requested. If you would like to be 
sent a copy of these, please leave your email address on the returned consent form. 
 
If you have any further questions regarding this study please contact any one of us above. 
Thank you for considering participation in this research. 
 
 
Megan Humphrey 
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Statement of consent 
 
I have read the information about this research and any questions I wanted to ask have been 
answered to my satisfaction. 
 
I agree for my child to participate in this research. I understand that he/she can withdraw my 
consent at any time, prior to the end of their participation.  
 
Name: __________________________________ 
 
 
Signature: __________________________________ 
 
 
Date: __________________________________ 
 
 
Student ID: __________________________________ 
 
Copy to:  
[a] participant,  
[b] researcher (initial both copies below)  
 
 
Please return one copy of this to the school and keep one copy for your own information.  
Thank you. 
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Information Sheet and consent form 
 
Megan Humphrey Dr. Gina Grimshaw 
MSc Student Supervisor 
megan.humphrey@vuw.ac.nz gina.grimshaw@vuw.ac.nz 
 
 
 
 
What is the purpose of this research? 
This research will allow us to examine how people perceive and interpret emotional tone of voice and 
how this relates to their level of anxiety. 
 
Who is conducting the research? 
• We are a team of researchers in the School of Psychology at Victoria University of Wellington. 
Dr. Grimshaw is supervising this project. This research has been approved by the University 
Human Ethics Committee. 
 
What is involved if you agree to participate? 
• If you agree to participate in this study, you will complete a short questionnaire about your mood 
where you will respond to questions such as “I worry about the future” and “I feel sorry for 
myself”. We anticipate that the questionnaire will take you no more than five minutes to 
complete. 
• You will also complete an emotion perception task in which you will listen to voices and judge 
the emotional tone of voice. We anticipate this task will take no longer than 20 minutes.  
• During the research you are free to withdraw, without any penalty at any point before the 
experiment has been completed.  
 
Privacy and Confidentiality 
• We will keep your consent forms and survey for at least five years after publication. 
• You will never be identified in my research project or in any other presentation or publication.  
• In accordance with the requirements of some scientific journals and organisations, your coded 
survey may be shared with other competent researchers. 
• Your coded data may be used in other, related studies.  
• A copy of the coded data will remain in the custody of Dr. Gina Grimshaw at Victoria University.  
 
What happens to the information that you provide? 
• The data you provide may be used for one or more of the following purposes: 
• The overall findings may be submitted for publication in a scientific journal, or presented at 
scientific conferences. 
• The overall findings will form part of a Masters thesis that will be submitted for assessment. 
 
If you would like to know the results of this study, they will be available approximately from 
December 2009 and can be sent to you via email or mail if requested. (If so, please write your email 
address on the consent form) 
If you have any further questions regarding this study please contact any one of us above. 
Thank you for considering participation in this research. 
Megan Humphrey 
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Statement of consent 
 
I have read the information about this research and any questions I wanted to ask have been 
answered to my satisfaction. 
 
I agree to participate in this research. I understand that I can withdraw my consent at any 
time, without penalty, prior to the end of my participation.  
 
Name: __________________________________ 
 
 
Signature: __________________________________ 
 
 
Date: __________________________________ 
 
 
Student ID: __________________________________ 
 
Copy to:  
[a] participant,  
[b] researcher (initial both copies below)  
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Megan Humphrey Dr. Gina Grimshaw 
MSc Student Supervisor 
megan.humphrey@vuw.ac.nz gina.grimshaw@vuw.ac.nz 
 
 
 
Debriefing statement  
Thank you for participating in this experiment. This study examined how people 
perceive and interpret emotional tone of voice, and the ways in which this perception and 
interpretation may be influenced by their anxiety level.  
Previous research suggests that anxious individuals are poor at detecting positive 
emotions in other modalities such as facial expressions or words, and that this may in fact be 
a maintaining factor which causes further anxiety. The same line of research also suggests 
that anxious individuals are better at interpreting negative emotions such as fear, sadness and 
anger in facial expression. Yet little research has explored emotional interpretation through 
tone of voice in anxiety. The small body of research to date suggests that anxious individuals 
are indeed poor at detecting positive prosody such as happiness and are enhanced at detecting 
negative prosody such as sadness and fearfulness.  
However, from the findings to date, we do not know if anxious individuals are really 
better at interpreting negative tone of voice, or if they are simply more likely to report a voice 
as being negative. I am interested in understanding the exact mechanisms behind the 
interpretation bias. That is, are anxious individual better at detecting fear, anger or sadness in 
another’s voice, or are they simply more likely to report that all voices sound threatening 
regardless of the actual tone of voice. Likewise with positive stimuli, are they really poor at 
detecting happy tone of voice, or simply less likely to report it?  
The outcome of this study will be important: Anxiety affects a large proportion of individuals 
during their lifetime. Having an understanding of specific deficits associated with anxiety 
will add great value to clinician’s abilities to understand and treat anxiety. For example, 
clinicians will be better informed on what types of thought patterns and perceptual 
impairments need to be the focus of treatment. 
If you have any further questions regarding this study please contact any one of us above. 
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Thank you for participating in this research. 
 
 
Recommended Reading 
 
Quadflieg, S., Wendt, B., Mohr, A., Miltner, W.H.R., & Straube, T., (2007) Recognition and  
evaluation of emotional prosody in individuals with generalized social phobia: A pilot 
study. Behavior Research and Therapy, 45 (12), 3096-3103 
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Megan Humphrey Dr. Gina Grimshaw  
MSc Student Supervisor 
megan.humphrey@vuw.ac.nz gina.grimshaw@vuw.ac.nz     (04)463 6420           
 
 
 
 
Debriefing statement  
Thank you for consenting for your child to participate in this experiment. This study 
looked at how children perceive and interpret emotional tone of voice, and the ways in which 
this perception and interpretation may be influenced by their anxiety level.  
Previous research suggests that anxious individuals are poor at identifying positive 
emotions in others, for example happy facial expressions. Additionally, anxious individuals 
are better at identifying negative emotions such as fear, sadness and anger in facial 
expression. There is some suggestion that these differences in the perception of others 
emotions may add to the difficulties faced by these people and may maintain their anxiety.  
The small body of research on vocal expressions of emotion suggests that anxious individuals 
are indeed poor at identifying positive emotional tone of voice such as happiness and are 
enhanced at identifying negative tones of voice such as sadness and fearfulness.  
However, from the findings to date, we do not know if anxious individuals are really 
better at interpreting negative tone of voice per se, or if they are simply more likely to report 
all voices as being negative. I am interested in understanding the exact mechanisms behind 
the interpretation bias. That is, are anxious individuals better at detecting fear, anger or 
sadness in another’s voice, or are they simply more likely to report that all voices sound 
threatening to them regardless of the actual tone of voice. Likewise, are they really poor at 
detecting happy tone of voice, or simply less likely to report it?  
The outcome of this research will have numerous valuable practical applications. 
Anxiety affects a large proportion of individuals during their lifetime. Having an 
understanding of specific deficits associated with anxiety at different ages will add great 
value to psychologists’ abilities to understand and treat anxiety. For example, professionals 
working with anxious children will be better informed on what types of thought patterns and 
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perceptual impairments need to be the focus of treatment and how this may vary as children 
grow up. 
Given that the questionnaires used to measure anxiety in this study were used purely in a 
research context and not as a diagnostic tool, we are unable to make any informed comments 
regarding any individual child’s anxiety level. For this reason we will not be providing 
parents with their child’s individual scores on these measures. However, if you are concerned 
about your child’s anxiety or depression level, contact details of appropriate services have 
been provided on the bottom of this page.  
 
Thank you to both yourself and your child for your involvement in this research. 
Any queries please contact any one of us above. 
 
 
Yours sincerely  
 
Megan Humphrey and Dr. Gina Grimshaw  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contact regarding any mental health issues: 
 
Victoria University Psychology Clinic 
5th Floor, Easterfield Building 
Victoria University of Wellington 
Kelburn Parade 
 
Phone: 04 463 6400 
Email psychclinic@vuw.ac.nz 
 
 
